In this context, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, it will examine why the 16 previous peace agreements did not end Liberia`s first civil war. Second, the article examines why the Abuja II peace agreement, the seventeenth peace agreement, was able to end the war. To solve the search problem, the article is divided into six parts. The first part examines theoretical questions, including a review of the scientific literature and the theoretical model that guides the study. Next, the study examines the factors and forces that caused the first Liberian civil war. Third, the article examines the content of the various peace agreements. Fourth, the study addresses the reasons for the failure of the previous 16 peace agreements to end the war. Fifth, this article examines why the Abuja II peace agreement succeeded in ending the civil war. Finally, the study draws the main conclusions. Third, the content of a peace agreement should aim to strike a balance between the critical variables of power-sharing, fear reduction and rising costs. In other words, peace agreements should strive to involve all warring parties in transitional regimes, to allay their fears, particularly in security, but to explicitly describe the cost of non-compliance. The Phase 1 agreement, signed just before the outbreak of the COVID 19 pandemic, did not end up anywhere.
A more serious issue of trust has arisen between the two countries, particularly after the dispute between the United States and China over the management of the epidemic and the assertion that China hid information about the pandemic in its earlier phase. The 11-country trade agreement, signed in March 2018, called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and its economies accounted for nearly 14% of the world`s gross domestic product (GDP). Despite this great concession to Taylor, he still refused to end the war. It was for a number of reasons. Although this peace agreement moved closer to the NPFL`s central requirement to regulate political power during the transition period, it could not satisfy Taylor`s ultimate desire to lead the transitional government. For this reason, the NPFL has declared itself ready to participate in the transitional government and further undermine the peace process. This strategy was also influenced by the fact that Burkina Faso and Côte d`Ivoire, although they continue to support the NPFL, were increasingly concerned about Taylor`s persistent deficit in the peace process. Thus, the NPFL decided to appease its two great supporters by appearing reasonable - by agreeing to serve in the transitional government. At the same time, the NPFL continued to play its role as a spoiler. What is important is that the NPFL`s half-approach has made it more difficult for ECOWAS, even though the organization had the political will, to force the Taylor-led militia to end its continued practice of undermining the peace process. But while the aspect of Tuesday`s event will recall the revolutionary agreements that ended decades of war between Israel and neighbouring countries, Egypt and Jordan, and launched the peace process with the Palestinians, the reality is quite different.